Topics in NBS Forum
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Name: Rebecca Ro
Date: //2001-09-16 14:28:57 :
Link to this Comment: 165
Our conception of consciousness is related to how we think about consciousness. ‘Conscious’ mean to come together with knowing. Is self- cognition really the main point of consciousness? When I think about consciousness I think about awareness, knowledge, and wakefulness. When we are awake, we are responsive to sensory input and therefore conscious. However, there are aspects of our concepts and other representational structures to which we have no conscious access to. Aren’t there separate mental states and conscious states? In my philosophy class we learned that consciousness can be knowledge, introspection and phenomenal experience. We also discussed different philosophers’ viewpoint on the complex state of consciousness. Philosophers have analyzed the relationship between consciousness, self, and self-consciousness.
I think we can try to explore consciousness scientifically. Hasn’t neurophysiological and neuroimaging research shown our activities being linked to specific brain activities in prefrontal cortex? By studying disorders of the self we would be able to learn more about consciousness and expand our knowledge of the mind. We can also look at cognitive models and executive systems in understanding the phenomena of consciousness itself.
Name: Huma Q. Ra
Date: //2001-09-16 20:25:51 :
Link to this Comment: 168
For me, consciousness is generally a complex and confusing idea. However, some thoughts that I associate it with are awareness of self and of others. It also includes thinking, learning, and perception. I believe that there are different levels of consciousness that exist within a definite hierarchy or scale of consciousness. For example, children differ from adults in consciousness and people in general differ from one another. Furthermore, since these different levels exist, consciousness must be measurable.
Within the scientific realm, the study of consciousness must be divided up. Consciousness is a large-encompassing idea and must be studied by more than one type of scientist. Recent studies on consciousness require the input of several disciplines: philosophy for conceptual foundations such as free will; neuroscience for neural correlates of consciousness; cognitive psychology for the study of implicit processes, memory and language; and physical and biological sciences for it?s relationship to space, time, evolution, and medicine.
I believe that it is possible to determine the brain processes of consciousness and to find it?s neural correlates. This would be most effectively done by studying failures in consciousness. For example, the study of schizophrenia or dissociative identity disorders could tell us about the mechanism of human self-consciousness. Furthermore, developments in PET, MRI and other brain-scanning technology enable scientists
to pinpoint the neural correlates of conscious experience. One example of this type of work is the recent research which found that engaging in prayer stimulates unique regions of the brain that are not utilized during activities that make up prayer (such as reading, thinking, reciting, or remembering).
Advances in technology may soon resolve the conundrum of consciousness. No longer will consciousness be an unanswerable problem to be dealt with by philosophers, but instead will help us to demystify the mind.
|"what consciousness means to me"|
Name: jimmy stei
Date: //2001-09-17 10:27:30 :
Link to this Comment: 179
This could be studied scientifically provided a more clear, precise, straightfoward definition was delivered. The definition as I have given it is too vague to be looked at efficiently or productively. However, if we understand consciousness as a product of the brain we can study it by looking at neural activity. We have plenty of technology to examine specific areas of the brain to look at many different questions. We can also look at consciousness from a development point of view. For instance, are adults who understand the cause and effect relationship between their actions and the their envioronment more conscious than children who lack a mature understanding of this relationship? Another good method for looking at cdonsciousness is to study disordered people who lack all (or some?) consciousness. Of course a specific definition is necessary in such a study because we must know what they must lack in order to determine that they lack consciousness. We could learn about consciousness by examining the differences in their behavior with the behavior of conscious people. There are many ways to look at consciousness and i think it just depends what you want to know about consciousness when you are deciding which methods to use.
Name: Liz Olson
Date: //2001-09-17 22:38:52 :
Link to this Comment: 194
Name: Nirupama K
Date: //2001-09-17 23:14:50 :
Link to this Comment: 197
I always seem to be puzzling over questions about the nature of consciousness. Personally, I still do not think that I have come close to grasping the answer. I do know that self-awareness is a big part of consciousness. The ability of an individual to say, I think therefore I am, to himself indicates this aspect of consciousness--but only to himself. How, then, can we know if judge if someone else is conscious? Couldn't they part of the Matrix? Who knows...things like free will may not exist at all if our universe is strictly determined. May-be not. There are some basic clues that seem to work: spontaneous action, self recognition and awareness, reaction and sensitivity to stimuli. In a physical sense consciousness is hard to define.
How do the vast neural networks in our cortex produce rational thought? They clearly have a method of communication, memory and coding for sensory information. I think that the nature of these connections can be effectively examined to provide great clues to consciousness.
Exploring computer models of artificial intelligence may help provide clues and definitions for consciousness. From a purely biological standpoint, an understanding of simpler organisms neural connections help to understand human consciousness and to explore the boundaries of consciousness. Also, brain imaging provides direct clues about the human brain's activity centers, and pathways. I'm sure there is much more out there and this is off-base, but I gave it my best shot (though it was very much off the top of my head).
|my Jung reflex|
Date: //2001-09-17 23:17:38 :
Link to this Comment: 198
Consciousness most certainly has to deal with being 'aware'. I wouldn't say 'awake' has anything to do with it, if only because a dog is awake, but not necessarily 'conscious' about things like the way we are. I think that 'consciousness' comes from the neocortex. It has to do with being able to categorize ideas (names, names of objects, verbs, adjectives, nouns-- AKA titles and groups that define as well as combine ideas together on a level other than proximity. (ie, combine by use, implication, thought-linkd phenomenon's)). Consciousness to me implies the thinking being. However, I suppose it depends on when and where you are using the term. Because the 'unconscious' the way the Jungians term it, may be able to do these categorizing and applying techniques. But just that the 'consciousness' doesn't know about it. So I suppose this would add another level, that the consciousness must be aware it is doing what it is doing. I think that's as specific and as general as I'm willing to be right now.
Physiologically speaking, there must be activity in the portion of the brain that allows for these categorizing techniques in order for these activities to occur. And when the brain works in this way, then the person is said to be conscious. However, if we take this to mean active and fluctuating brain waves, then is dreaming consciousness? Some people would say yes. What if we're conscious there but just don't remember. I'm not sure if I'm prepared to go into that just yet. But I think this is as far and as safe as I feel to go into this topic. Now to read the article.
Date: //2001-09-17 23:27:28 :
Link to this Comment: 199
Name: Caitlin Co
Date: //2001-09-18 01:49:32 :
Link to this Comment: 201
One of the problems we run into, however, when we try to draw a distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness comes from making this the distinction in the first place. By searching for an understanding of consciousness by contrasting it with unconsciousness, we lose another distincion, that between being able to experience consciousness and not having this capacity...the distinction, perhaps, between consciousness and "nonconsciousness." I once heard the capacity for consciousness explained this way: if something is conscious, then there is something that it is like to be that thing. For instance, the question "what is it like to be a rock?" doesn't have an answer, because it isn't like anything to be a rock; the rock is not conscious. But once we leave the mineral class and start regarding the animal kingdom, this "explanation" doesn't get us very far. Although philosophically I think this question gives us a really interesting way to think about consciousness, scientifically it is a pretty difficult theory to investigate, because the subjects don't tell us what, if anything, it is like to be them. If we ask, "what is it like to be an ant?", how do we know if there is an answer, or much less what that answer might be? Is it "like" anything to be an ant? A mouse? a monkey? even a human infant? I've often wondered what it is like to be a baby, and now I wonder if it is really like anything. I'm pretty sure it's not like anything to be an 8-cell embryo (although I could be wrong on that), and I can kind of remember what it is like to be a 3-year-old, so it seems that we must gain the capacity for consciousness somewhere in between. But when? and how? and how can we investigate it through examining neural functioning? Obviously I have no clue. But this question of who or what is conscious has some interesting moral implications, among others issues of animal rights and human rights issues like abortion and euthanasia.
Date: //2001-09-18 10:36:07 :
Link to this Comment: 203
But back to being unconscious, are normal, healthy people ever truly unconscious? It depends on the definition, we may not be totally aware of everything we are doing but that simply means our subconscious mind is at work. I believe there are simply different levels of consciousness at work. For when we are sleeping we are still conscious we are just at the lowest level of the continuum. Yes it is true that there are people who are unconscious but there is something wrong with their brain functioning. I believe because we are able to behave as we do we must be conscious hence the saying “brain equals behavior.” I also believe other animals are conscious maybe just not to the same level that we are. For while they may not be able to reason and think logically they still know how to react- an ant runs at the possibility of being squashed, mother ducks won’t go near their young if they smell humans on them, bears protect their cubs. I’m not quite sure about all of this yet, I hope that by the end of the course it will become a little clearer.
Name: julia diep
Date: //2001-09-18 12:10:59 :
Link to this Comment: 204
Name: caroline r
Date: //2001-09-18 14:29:37 :
Link to this Comment: 206
|in defense of Searle.|
Date: //2001-09-19 21:51:48 :
Link to this Comment: 237
First of all, the Western psychological study of cognitive develpment sill involves the study of some sort of consciousness, however narrow and restricted on occasion. Thus, what Piaget studied as formal operational thought-- which was conceived as a mathematical structure (the INRC groupings)-- is one legitamate way to slice the stream of consciousness at that point, but hardly exhausts the snapshots we can take of consciousness at that particular bend in the River. Numerous other and equally valid perspectives exist for defining consciousness at that stage, from role taking to epistemlogical styles to worldviews to moral drives. But in focusing on cognitive develppment, Piaget was at least highlighting the central importance oc consciousness development, even if in a sometimes narrow way.
That importance is underscored by the fact that, when specific developmental lines are studied-- such as moral development, self development, and role-taking decelopment00 it has always been found that cognitive development is necessary (but not sufficient) for these other developments. In other words, before you can develop morals, or self-perspective, or some idea of the good life, you have to be able to consciously register those various elements in the first place. Consciousness is thus necessary, but not sufficient, for these other developments.
And that is exactly the claim of teh Great Nest theorists. The levels of the Great Nest (the basic structures of consciousness) are the levels through which the various developmental lines will proceed, and without the basic waves, there is nothing for the various boats to float on. This is why the basic structures (whther conceived as the sheaths in ...[examples that dont matter]) are the backbone, the crucial skeleton, on which most other systems hang.
Thus, although they can by no means be equated, cognitive development (as studied by Western psychologists) is perhaps the closes thing we have to the Great Chain or the spectrum of consciousness (at least up to the levels of the formal mind; beyond that most Western researchers recognize no forms of cognition at all). For this reason -- while keeping firmly in mind the many qualifications and limitations -- I sometimes use cognitive terms to describe some of the basic structures
Still, because cognitive development does have a very specific and narrow meaning in Western psychology, I also treat it as a seperate developmental line apart from teh basic structures (so that we can preserve the ontological richness of the basic holons, and not reduce them to Western cognitive categories).
One of the most interesting items on [charts he has] is the number of Western psychologists who, based on extensive empicical phenomenological data, have detected several stages of postformal development -- that is, stages of cognitive development beyond linear rationality (ie beyond formal operational thinkjing of formal operational). Although "postformal" can refer to any and all stages beyon formop, it usually applies only to mental and personal, not supramental and transpersonal, stages. IN OTHER WORDS, for most Western researchers, "postformal" refers to the first major stage beyond formop, which I call 'vision-logic'. As shown, most researchers have found two to four stages of post formal (vision-logic) cognition. Thesae postformal stages generally move beyond the formal/mechanistic phases (of early formop) into various stages of relativity, pluralistic systems, and contextualism (early vison-logic), and from there into stages of metasystematic, integrated, unified, dialectical, and holistic thinking (middle to late vision-logic). This gives us a picture of the highest mental domains as being dynamic, developmental, dialectical, integrated.
Few of those researchers, however move into transmental domains (of psychic, subtle, causal, or nondual occasions --transrational nd transpersonal), although many of them increasingly acknowlege these higher levesl. For the contours of these levels we must often rely, once again, on the great sages and contemplatives, as several of the charts make clear.
In this regard, a hotly disputed topic is whether the spiritual/transpersonal stages themselves can be conceived as higher levels of cognitive development. The answer, I have suggested, depends on what you mean by 'cognitive'. If you mean that most Western psychologists mean-- which is a mental conceptual knowledge of exterior objects-- then no, higher or spiritual stages are NOT mental cognition, because they are often supramental, transconceptual and nonexterior. If by "cognitive" you mean "consciousness in general," including superconscious states, then much higher speiritual experience is indeed cogntive. But spiritual and transpersonal states also have many other aspects -- such as higher affects, morals, and self-sense -- so that, even with an expanded definition of cognitive, they are not Merely cognitive. Nontheless, "cognition" in the broadest sense means "cosciousness," and thus cognitive developments of various sorts are an important part of the entire spectrum of being and knowing.
Date: //2001-09-19 23:12:28 :
Link to this Comment: 239
Date: //2001-10-02 13:20:37 :
Link to this Comment: 360
|history of mind part I|
Name: jimmy stei
Date: //2001-10-02 14:05:02 :
Link to this Comment: 361
Humphrey spends some time discussing how colors can affect us without our awareness. This is interesting with respect to consciousness because it is occurring outside of our consciousness. It is merely a phisiological response. When we or when a more primitive organism is excited by red light it isn't because we are thinking that this is excitement. Instead our bodies are just reacting more or less outside of our control. It's not our like or dislike of the color that is adding to our physiological changes. Although an organism may live more comfortably in light of a certain color that does not mean that that organism has preference for it based on its own volition. Instead that preference is based on physical mechanisms.
Speaking of color, I was under the impression that vision was in fact a serial process. The photoreceptors are impinged upon and the message gets sent (eventually) to the primary visual cortex in the occipital lobe, but it isnt given meaning till the message is sent to the visual association cortex (where perception takes place). Perception follows sensation. If those important sensory receptors were cut off from the brain you would not be able to have perceptions except through imagination and dreaming.
Name: Liz Olson
Date: //2001-10-02 15:35:48 :
Link to this Comment: 363
Name: Caitlin Co
Date: //2001-10-02 18:03:37 :
Link to this Comment: 364
Anyway...as to the more relevant (to us earthlings) aspects of monism...
not that I buy into the whole William James "i feel sad because i am crying" thing, but there are those studies that have shown that people feel happier if they smile, and sometimes if my eyes are watering I catch myself feeling sad. However, our many emotional experiences lead us to believe that it has to be more complicated than sensation=perception. But what about in the 5-senses kinds of perceptions? Can we say that perception precedes, or even causes, sensation? There are all those exceptions, for example phenomena like phantom pain in amputees. Is this perception without sensation? If this can happen in the tactile modality, it seems that it should be possible with vision as well. I'm kind of contradicting myself here...I guess I just feel unresolved about the directionality/causality of perception and sensation.
Date: //2001-10-02 19:11:25 :
Link to this Comment: 365
Another interesting issue I found in Humphrey was his chapter on color. One of his main points was that red has been shown to be a color that evokes negative emotions in people, such as anger and depression, whereas colors such as blue or green evoked more positive feelings, such as quietness and calmness. Humphrey stated that he believes these reactions are not learned, but I wonder about that statement. My first reaction to his claims was that red is a color often associated with love, and thus would make people feel warm and happy inside, not mad and angry. In addition, blue is often seen as a color representative of sadness and gloominess. I wonder if there are other studies that contradict the findings that Humphrey has used to support his argument – although I suppose even if this were the case his main point that colors arouse us (in some way) would still be supported. I also find it interesting that the examples Humphrey used all seemed to be ones were people were not consciously told to attend to the colors specifically – the color happened to be the paint on the wall or the color of a movie prop. I wonder if the physiological reactions of these people would have been different if they were consciously aware of their surroundings (and thus thought about red symbolizing love and blue symbolizing sadness)...
Date: //2001-10-02 19:22:16 :
Link to this Comment: 366
|History of the Mind|
Name: Rebecca Ro
Date: //2001-10-02 21:33:28 :
Link to this Comment: 369
Perception and sensation, according to Humphrey, do involve different kinds of attention or different attitudes of the mind. However, pereption is in the interpretation of sensory input to yield a meaningful description or understanding. Sensation is the faculty to perceive. I see perception and sensation as overlapping. To sense something, don't we need to perceive it?
Date: //2001-10-23 13:47:11 :
Link to this Comment: 496
It also upset me because if a psychoanalsyt discredits the medical model of psychology as much as he did it is damaging because the only reason psychotherapy and drug therapy for mental health problems began to be covered by many insurance companies was that it was finally acknowlegded to have biological and not just social causes. I believe more in the biopsychosocial model. I beleive he is doing the whole medical and psychological community a disservice by promoting his views.
Name: Liz Olson
Date: //2001-10-23 13:57:37 :
Link to this Comment: 497
Date: //2001-10-23 14:49:13 :
Link to this Comment: 498
Having a discussion on Tuesday night?s lecture would be more interesting than spending more time on Humphrey.
Name: Rebecca Ro
Date: //2001-10-23 15:57:48 :
Link to this Comment: 499
|History of the Mind|
Name: Julia Diep
Date: //2001-10-23 17:34:17 :
Link to this Comment: 509
Date: //2001-10-23 17:39:13 :
Link to this Comment: 510
First off. Even when Humphrey tries to be scientific, he fails. The whole point of Being scientific in his examples (like all the vision stuff) is because otherwise, he's more often ambiguous. However, what help is it if he's ambiguous While he's scientific? Exactly, there isn't any.
I can't stress how many times, in the margins of my book I write a simple "No!" when it comes to his logics, even when he gets scientific. For example "Since iformation aboutthe particular stimulus was now beign preserved and carried through into the particular action pattern, the action pattern had come to represent-- at least to replicate symbolically-- the stimulus" (p41). No!! More than one stimulus can cause a single response. Particularly in these organisims way back then, who had a limit of responses 'run away, curl up, eat' etc. Harsh chemicals, weird lighting, a solid object in the way, could all make an amoeba move. So No, he can't say that all the responses become immediate representations and make his further points... because something in the animal will discern that the relationship isn't one to one, two to two, but two to one and one to one and three to one and so on.
How about his use of 'my' for amoebas. Doesn't 'my' imply ownership by a Thing? Well, that Thing in this case is the Conscious Thing. AKA.. when he uses it on some occasions, he's putting consciousness in there, which is exactly what he's trying to avoid. (p40)
Almost every last sentence of every last chapter, in my opinion, jumps to too many conclusions. He takes a chapter to explain something thuroughly and then he leaps to some weird, whacky split conclusions (i.e. p44) that he didn't prove yet. That's poor writing.
How about random assumptions or just silly 'facts' 'in almost all circumstances human beings prefer lightness to darkness' (p58). Um. What are you talking about Humphrey? He hasn't explained why it MIGHT be a plausable statement in Some circumstances when light and dark is better defined. People Like to sleep in the dark. What does this have to do with what he later goes to prove? He can't find amazing facts off of a foundation that is so ...ill put and proved.
How about his experiments (chapter 8) saying the monkey 'liked' certain things. How does he know the monkey 'LIKES' these things. That it's just not some other random character that has to do with the thing being presented. Maybe certain shapes are just adverse to monkeys, or colours have been genetically programed as represnting something negative... it just seems weird to put 'like' in such an unquestionable facility in his research.
heh.. in his section on the 'inverted spectrum' (p71) the opposite of blue is Orange, thank you very much Humphrey. [low blow, it felt good though]
|Wrapping up Humphrey (and throwing him the lake)|
Date: //2001-10-23 17:48:39 :
Link to this Comment: 511
Sorry for making everything italics there. The italicized statement should only have been about 5-8 words long.
on page 85 Humphrey takes us on a short, given-as-fact and Humphrey-accepted inclusion of the paranormal. I thought this to be a little..esoteric if anything. What is that doing in here? Please leave it out.
His examples of the game of Chinese whispers on 103 is COMPLETELY out of context. His point to begin with is vague, and then his example doesn't take care of a million other variables that changed by changing the context. Like passing a solid object around is less hard to just alter than words. (p103)
I think he should have given his top down section a lot more looking at since the 'top' is supposed to be 'consciousness' afterall.
Chapter 15 was Trying to be helpful. However his fourth point confused me..I think there was a leap in it. And his seventh point implies that animals have a consciousness. I guess so if he's reducing consciousness to the criteria of Just being awake. Because that's all you need to Feel sensations. And that means a bug is conscious, because it does feel sensations. I disagree in otherwords. At least I think consciousness should be more narrowed to include only human beings. Otherwise the mystery of it is all gone. Or at least, I don't think it would be As profound.
That talk with the little kid would have Never have happened the way he did it. I think he's getting a little too literary for his own good. And, as he's been doing with the entire book, he's changing everything so it makes his hypothesis (what was it again?) look good. He's good at (or rather, he tries to Often) hide the foundations for all his statements with just little alterations each phase of the game. Well, if you don't catch the little things, you get swept up in his big hypothesis, where all the little diversions and misdirections add up to a Huge problem
And That...is what my major problem was with Mr. Humphrey.
Date: //2001-10-23 17:49:32 :
Link to this Comment: 512
Name: caitlin co
Date: //2001-10-23 18:01:18 :
Link to this Comment: 513
The argument seemed to pick up toward the end, when he started to discuss the evolutionary development of sensation and consciousness. His explanation here was a lot more grounded because he was drawing from history and example instead of metaphor and analogy. For the sake of making the concept relevant and understandable, going from simple to complex through real life forms makes more sense than relating the mysteries of the mind to Alice and Wonderland and including helpful diagrams of the “inner conductor”/ “I function” with all of his “musical instruments”/”boxes within boxes.” I started to give Humphrey a lot more credit when he finally acknowledged the “phantom limb” issue, which had been such a saliently absent point throughout the book thus far. It still brings up the question, though, of that poor guy cut off from input from all five sensory modalities. Would this person still be consciousness, from the activation of the sensory cortex, like the phantom limb people? Is the sensory dep guy conscious only through memory of sensation? That’s what Humphrey would say, I think--“mental activities other than those involving direct sensations enter consciousness only insofar as they are accompanied by ‘reminders’ of sensation” (p. 116). But I can’t shake the impression that the person would be conscious for a different reason: through his awareness that there was an outside environment and that he had a place in it; in other words, through his perceptions. But according to Humphrey, perception doesn’t make consciousness, sensation does.
And that is perhaps the most trouble I had with his theory of consciousness—the distinction between sensation and perception. I’m not sure I agree that consciousness requires sensation in the form of “affect-laden mental representations of something happening here and now to me” (p. 115). From what we had been discussing earlier, affect really had to do with perception, not sensation. Humphrey talks about seeing a light as red as being a sensation (p. 94), but it seems that the affective part of this experience, the knowing that the light is red, is really a perception. Couldn’t the same sensation—the same light doing the same thing to the brain—produce a completely different experience in someone whose brain was different somehow, such that that person had a green experience or something instead of a red experience? So isn’t the red experience really perception? Also, in terms of early organisms, or in curly bugs or whatever, I doubt there is really affect, but I would still call it sensation. To attribute affect to sensation, and then sensation to consciousness, necessitates a really arbitrary distinction—what separates affect from no affect? And arbitrary distinctions are really not all that helpful. It would make a lot more sense, I think, to separate unconsciousness from consciousness by distinguishing between sensation and perception.
Moving on....I agree that a discussion of Dr. Frattaroli’s lecture would be more productive than spending the class complaining about this book. I was a little put off by his dismissal of the biological components of depression, but I think the really strong placebo effect of antidepressant medications is a significant point. However, I wonder how much of the placebo effect was, as he said, due to participants thinking they were taking a drug that was working, and how much had to do with just being involved in a study on depression. I would think that patients, knowing they were in a depression study, might start thinking about depression in different ways, possibly changing their thought patterns and behavior as a result, and this might have some influence too. It would be interesting to include a group that was not given a pill at all but knew they were in the study, to see if there was any change in them.
I was equally skeptical (and equally kind of offended), but in the opposite direction, of a behavioral neuroscience lecture last week where Prof. Thomas argued for a completely biological (damage to the hypothalamus) explanation of eating disorders. In both these cases, it seems to me that it has to be a neurological predisposition, mediated by sociocultural and other factors, leading to the disorders. But isn’t that always the answer: “it’s a combination; we can’t separate the two,” nature/nurture, chicken/egg, etc.? Maybe Dr. Frattaroli was just trying to take a decisive stand for a change instead of straddling the fence. Anyway, though, I think we could have a lot to discuss about the lecture.
Date: //2001-10-23 18:42:37 :
Link to this Comment: 514
Date: //2001-10-23 19:06:26 :
Link to this Comment: 515
I still disagree with Humphrey’s definitions of sensation and perception and since these are essential to his main arguments, I find it impossible to agree with him on many of his points. I feel like he just made up these definitions, and that they do not accurately convey the meaning that our society and other scientists have given them. However, if I were to hypothetically accept his definitions for a moment, I can find a few of his points with which I would agree. One such example, given his definition of sensation as “what is happening to me” and perception as “what is happening out there,” is his argument on page 133 that involves someone else’s ability to “perceive the same events at my body surface that I myself am sensing.” However, he goes on to say that people’s perceptions in general should have the same content – but I wonder if that is true. For instance, using Humphrey’s example that if we hear the same music, then our perceptions should have the same content. What about the difference between an experienced composer and a naďve listener? Doesn’t their differing levels of experience with music and its properties determine how they each experience “what is happening out there?” Even if you take out the role of interpretation in this scenario, I would still think that the composer would be much more likely to instinctively perceive a musical in B flat with the woodwinds section than the person with little or no musical background would instinctively perceive. All in all, I think that this book certainly had its flaws, but I hope that there are some useful things that we can gather from it, even if it is just what we think consciousness is not (rather than what it is).
Date: //2001-10-23 23:57:37 :
Link to this Comment: 518