I like the distinction between 'free will' and 'free whim' and find that distinction to also be applicable to this notion of 'purpose' as it relates to Langton's Ant, real ants, or me. Langton's Ant makes only a couple determinations or judgements - and those are restricted to whether or not it should turn right/left or turn the space on/off. The more intricate road-building pattern emerges whimsically, in the sense that a decision or judgement was not made by the ant to engage in road-building activities at any moment. Whimsical in this sense does not retain the common-place understanding of 'unpredictability', 'randomness', nor 'spontaneous'. It is instead deterministic. In Part 3A , Langton's Ant (and general reality is alluded to) is characterized as containing an agent, an environment, and sequential steps in time. I think it may be useful to collapse the agent and environment categories into a single category, or at least make the claim that the agent operates whimsically as defined above. This is related to Wolfram's thoughts on a linear CA's ability to model reality. I am not convinced about this development of agents or agency. I suppose my reluctance in accepting the agency idea for the CA, the notion of of purpose for Langton's Ant, and PG's Conjecture all stem from the same source - which is my reluctance to consider any particular aspect or object as 'special' - or more appropriately, 'more special than the next'. It seems like all aspects and objects operate under the same rules and to confer extra-speciality upon one would be disingenuous.